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COVERAGE OF APARTMENT BUILDING MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL
UNDER TE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT
AMENDMENTS OF 1974
Brennan v. Jaffey, 380 F. Supp. 373 (D. Del. 1974)
Defendant, in the business of leasing apartments, employed mainte-
nance personnel who worked in defendant's buildings.' Janitorial sup-
plies, purchased from manufacturers and local wholesalers and retailers,
were used by the workers to maintain and repair defendant's property.
The Secretary of Labor brought an action2 to enjoin defendant from
violating the Fair Labor Standards Act.3 Defendant moved for summa-
ry judgment, alleging that his employees were not covered by the Act.4
The United States District Court for the District of Delaware granted the
1. Jobs performed by the maintenance personnel included cleaning apartments at
the expiration of tenancies, minor carpentry repairs, minor electrical work, and main-
tenance of heating and air conditioning units. Brennan v. Jaffey, 380 F. Supp. 373, 375
(D. Del. 1974).
2. The defendant maintained that a prior decision, Brennan v. Apartment Com-
munities, Corp., 360 F. Supp. 1255 (D. Del. 1973) had held the Fair Labor Standards
Act, see note 3 infra, inapplicable to similar activities. In that case, the defendant-corpo-
ration successfully argued that it was itself the "ultimate consumer," see note 14 infra,
of the supplies used by the maintenance personnel. 360 F. Supp. at 1259, citing with
approval Hamlet Ice Co. v. Fleming, 127 F.2d 165 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S.
634 (1942); Shultz [sic] v. Arnheim & Neely, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 987 (W.D. Pa. 1969),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Hodgson v. Araheim & Neely, Inc., 444 F.2d 609 (3d
Cir. 1971), rev'd sub nom. Brennan v. Arnheim & Neely, Inc., 410 U.S. 512 (1973).
In Apartment Communities, Judge Steel distinguished two cases, Goldberg v. Furman
Beauty Supply, Inc., 300 F.2d 16 (3d Cir. 1962) (lotions and creams used by beauty
shop passed on to patrons), and Hodgson v. David M. Woolin & Son, Inc., 65 CCH
Lab. Cas. 44,865 (S.D. Fla. 1971) (household appliances, purchased by building corpo-
ration, passed on to tenants), and rejected outright two other cases, Hodgson v. River-
mont Corp., 71 CCH Lab. Cas. 45,962 (M.D. Fla. 1973), and Sharp v. Warning Holding
Co., 70 CCH Lab. Cas. 45,710 (D. Minn. 1972). Brennan v. Apartment Communities
Corp., supra at 1260-61.
3. Act of June 25, 1938, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060, as amended, Act of August 9,
1939, ch. 605, 53 Stat. 1266, Act of July 20, 1949, ch. 352, 63 Stat. 446, Fair Labor
Standards Amendments of 1949, ch. 376, 63 Stat. 910, Fair Labor Standards Amend-
ments of 1955, ch. 867, 69 Stat. 711, Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1961, Pub.
L. No. 87-30, 75 Stat. 65, Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-
601, 80 Stat. 830, Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. 93-259, 88 Stat.
58, codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1970, Supp. IV, 1974). Derendant allegedly vio-
lated provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act §§ 6, 7, 11, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207, 211
(1970, Supp. IV, 1974), which contain the minimum wage, overtime, and record keeping
requirements of the Act.
4. Brennan v. Jaffey, 380 F. Supp. 373 (D. Del. 1974).
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motion in part and denied it in part, and held: The 1974 amendments to
the Fair Labor Standards Act preclude use of the ultimate consumer
exclusion to deny coverage of the Act to apartment building mainte-
nance personnel.5
The Fair Labor Standards Act' was intended to eliminate substand-
ard labor conditions in occupations involved in interstate commerce.' As
originally enacted, the Act covered only employees "engaged in com-
merce"8 or in "the production of goods for commerce." 9  Amendments
5. Brennan v. Jaffey, 380 F. Supp. 373, 378-79 (D. Del. 1974).
6. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1970, Supp. IV, 1974).
7. Fair Labor Standards Act § 2, 29 U.S.C. § 202 (1970, Supp. IV, 1974); see
Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 135 F.2d 320 (5th Cir. 1943),
aff'd, 321 U.S. 590 (1944). Although Congress invoked something less than its full
plenary power under the commerce clause by using the language "in commerce" the Act
has been construed to afford broad coverage.
8. Fair Labor Standards Act § 2(a), 29 U.S.C. § 202(a) (1970). "Commerce"
is defined in § 3(b) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 203(b) (1970), as "trade, commerce, trans-
portation, transmission, or communication among the several States or between any State
and any place outside thereof." This definition extends to any channel of commerce,
but workers are covered only if they are "in commerce." See McLeod v. Threlkeld, 319
U.S. 491 (1943); Overstreet v. North Shore Corp., 318 U.S. 125 (1943); Walling v.
Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 U.S. 564 (1943) (employees receiving interstate shipments).
Determination of whether an employee is "engaged in commerce" may be made by ref-
erence to the use of the instrumentalities of commerce, the essentiality of a job to com-
merce, and the link between the employees and the instrumentalities. Thus, the Act ap-
plies to workers in transportation and communications jobs and to those directly con-
nected with the instrumentalities of interstate commerce. See, e.g., J.F. Fitzgerald
Constr. Co. v. Pedersen, 324 U.S. 720 (1945) (repair of railroad bridges); Overstreet
v. North Shore Corp., supra (toll road and drawbridge operators over a navigable water-
way); Mid-Continent Pipe Line Co. v. Hargrave, 129 F.2d 655 (10th Cir. 1942) (watch-
men of an oil pipe line); Phillips v. Meeker Co-op. Light & Power Ass'n, 63 F. Supp.
733 (D. Minn. 1945), aff'd, 158 F.2d 698 (8th Cir. 1946) (maintenance workers on
interstate power lines). The Act may extend to roads and highways, including their
maintenance and repair. Walling v. McCrady Constr. Co., 60 F. Supp. 243 (W.D. Pa.
1945), af'd, 156 F.2d 932 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 785 (1946). The shipment
or receipt of goods that have used the instrumentalities of commerce may also invoke
coverage. See Wirtz v. Wohl Shoe Co., 382 F.2d 848 (5th Cir. 1967) (clerical employ-
ees who prepare reports for out of state mailing); Cushway v. Stork Eng'r Co., 51 F.
kapp. 568 (E.D. Mich. 1943), aff'd per curiam, 142 F.2d 463 (6th Cir. 1944); Walling
v. L. Wieman Co., 52 F. Supp. 131 (E.D. Wise.), aff'd, 138 F.2d 602 (7th Cir. 1943).
But see Walling v. Mutual Wholesale Food & Supply Co., 46 F. Supp. 939, 945 (D.
Minn. 1942), modified, 141 F.2d 331 (8th Cir. 1944).
More generally, since "engaged in commerce" covers only employees who are "in com-
merce," the broad test is whether an employee's activities are so closely related to the
movement of commerce to be a part of it. Mitchell v. C.W. Vollmer & Co., 349 U.S.
427 (1955); McLeod v. Threlkeld, supra; Beneficial Fin. Co. v. Wirtz, 346 F.2d 340
(7th Cir. 1965); Mitchell v. Brown, 224 F.2d 359 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 875
(1955); Walling v. Consumers Co., 149 F.2d 626 (7th Cir. 1945); Noonon v. Fruco
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Constr. Co., 140 F.2d 633 (8th Cir. .1943); Wirtz v. Sherman Enterprises, Inc., 229 F.
Supp. 746 (D. Md. 1964). Courts have evaluated whether, without the particular serv-
ice or occupation, commerce would be impeded or abated. Overstreet v. North Shore
Corp., supra; Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., supra; Stewart-Jorden Distrib. Co. v.
Tobin, 210 F.2d 427 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1013 (1954). It is the activity
of the employee, not the employer, that determines coverage. The percentage of time
the employee dedicates to commerce in any given workweek is not determinative. See
Mabee v. White Plains Publishing Co., 327 U.S. 178 (1946); United States v. Darby,
312 U.S. 100 (1941); Montalvo v. Tower Life Bldg., 426 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1970);
cf. Kelly v. Ford, Bacon & Davis, Inc., 162 F.2d 555 (3d Cir. 1947) (insubstantial
though regular use of the mails not enough to invoke coverage).
The Act does not, however, reach every occupation "affecting" commerce. Congress
invoked something less than its full plenary power under the commerce clause. Mitchell
v. H.B. Zachry Co., 362 U.S. 310 (1960); Higgins v. Carr Bros. Co., 317 U.S. 572
(1943); A.B. Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517 (1942); United States v. Darby,
supra; Wirtz v. Wohl Shoe Co., supra; Wirtz v. Ferguson, 317 F.2d 343 (5th Cir. 1963);
Walling v. Mutual Wholesale Food & Supply Co., supra.
If an occupation is related to the continuity of commerce, it may be covered, but goods
which have "come to rest" at a specific point, and an occupation at such a point, may
not be "in commerce" and therefore not covered by the Act. See Davisson, Cov-
erage of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 41 MrcH. L. REv. 1060, 1067-72 (1943).
In one case, employees in trash collection were not covered even though they carried
trash across state lines to dump it. See Barnett v. A-1 Scavenger Serv. Co., 65 CCH
Lab. Cas. 44,672 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971). But see Schultz v. Instant Handling, Inc., 418
F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1969), which held that since trash removal was essential to defend-
ant's operations, employees removing trash were covered under the "production of goods
for commerce" language, see note 9 infra. See also 29 C.F.R. § 779.103 (1975); Note,
The Supreme Court and Fair Labor Standards, 1941-45, 59 HARv. L. REv. 321 (1946).
9. Fair Labor Standards Act § 2(a), 29 U.S.C. § 202(a) (1970). Although "pro-
duction" is not defined in the Act, "produced" is defined in § 3(j) of the Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 203(j) (1970) (emphasis added):
"Produced" means produced, manufactured, mined, handled or in any other
manner worked on in any State; and. .. an employee shall be deemed to have
been engaged in the production of goods if such employee was employed in
producing, manufacturing, mining, handling, transporting, or in any other man-
ner working on such goods, or in any closely related process or occupation di-
rectly essential to the production thereof, in any State.
The Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1949, ch. 376, 63 Stat. 910, inserted "closely
related," and substituted "directly essential" for the word "necessary" in the original Act.
See H. WEcsrr, WAGE-HOuR LAw-CovwRAG 179-264 (1951) (change in language was
an attempt to narrow the scope of this section while expanding the scope of employees
"engaged in commerce," 29 U.S.C. § 202(a) (1970)).
The "engaged in . . . the production of goods for commerce" language has been held
to reach all steps in a production process and all operations incident to the involvement
of goods in commerce, even if there is no physical contact with the goods. See, e.g.,
Mitchell v. C.W. Volmer & Co., 349 U.S. 427 (1955); A.B. Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling,
316 U.S. 517 (1942) (maintenance employees of a loft building crucial to lessees' opera-
tions by furnishing light, power, and heat); E.C. Schroder Co. v. Clifton, 153 F.2d 385
(10th Cir. 1946); Hertz Drivurself Stations, Inc. v. United States, 150 F.2d 923 (8th cir.
1945).
Products sold or services rendered to customers who are in commerce can invoke cov-
erage. Mitchell v. Raines, 238 F.2d 186 (5th Cir. 1956) (sale of lumber to state high-
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in 196110 and 196611 expanded coverage of the Act to all employees of
an "enterprise 12 engaged in commerce or in the production of goods
way department for construction of roads used by mail carriers); Lewis v. Florida Power
& Light Co., 154 F.2d 751 (5th Cir. 1946) (transmission of electric power interstate);
Phillips v. Star Overall Dry Cleaning Laundry Co., 149 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) (clean-
ing of garments for another laundry which rented them to interstate customers); Hanson
v. Lagerstrom, 133 F.2d 120 (8th Cir. 1943) (serving meals to interstate travelers).
The language "in any ... manner working on goods" serves to broaden the term
"produced," but the limiting language "closely related" and "directly essential" excludes
those activities that are purely local in nature. See Mitchell v. H.B. Zachry Co., 362 U.S.
310 (1960); Mitchell v. Wade Lahar Constr. Co., 179 F. Supp. 551 (W.D. Ark. 1960),
aff'd, 290 F.2d 408 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 992 (1961). A temporary delay
in the production process or a temporary halt in commerce, however, will not negate
coverage when it otherwise is appropriate. McComb v. Wyandotte Furniture Co., 169
F.2d 766 (8th Cir. 1948).
The employer's expectation that goods will move in commerce is a key factor in de-
armining whether goods were produced "for commerce." See, e.g., United States v.
Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (expectation is enough to invoke coverage whether the
goods actually did so move); Bracey v. Luray, 138 F.2d 8 (4th Cir. 1943); Enterprise
Box Co. v. Fleming, 125 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1942). The activities of the employee,
however, are determinative of whether he is "engaged in. . . the production of goods."
Mitchell v. Lublin, McGaughy & Associates, 358 U.S. 207 (1959); Wilson v. Recon-
struction Fin. Corp., 158 F.2d 564 (5th Cir. 1946); Walling v. Mutual Wholesale Food
& Supply Co., 141 F.2d 331 (8th Cir. 1944).
See generally George & Lambert, Wage-Hour Coverage of the Fair Labor Standards
Act, 36 MINN. L. REv. 454 (1952); Leiter, Coverage Confusion Under the Fair Labor
Standards Act, 13 LAB. LJ. 139 (1962); Willis, The Evolution of the Fair Labor Stand-
ards Act, 26 U. MIAMI L. REv. 607, 611-25 (1972); 29 C.F.R. §§ 779.104, .105 (1975).
Summarizing the difficulties of determining coverage under this portion of the Act, Jus-
tice Frankfurter noted that
[t]o search for a dependable touchstone by which to determine whether em-
ployees are "engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce"
is as rewarding as an attempt to square the circle.
A.B. Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517, 520 (1942).
10. Act of May 5, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-30, § 2, 75 Stat. 65, as amended 29 U.S.C.
1203 (1970).
11. Act of Sept. 23, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601, §§ 101-03, 80 Stat. 830-32, as
amended, 29 U.S.C. § 203 (1970).
12. Section 3(r) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 203(r) (Supp. IV, 1974), states in relevant
part:
"Enterprise" means the related activities performed (either through unified op-
eration or common control) by any person or persons for a common business
purpose, and includes all such activities whether performed in one or more
establishments or by one or more corporate or other organizational units in-
cluding departments of an establishment operated through leasing arrangements
Thus, the test of whether business activities constitute an enterprise turns on whether
they are a "unified operation" or under "common control," whether the activities are
"related," and whether there is a "common business purpose." See Wirtz v. Savannah
Bank & Trust Co., 362 F.2d 857 (5th Cir. 1966).
The "enterprise" concept was introduced into the law by the 1961 amendments
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for commerce" in which the employees are "handling, selling, or
otherwise working" on goods "that have been moved in or produced for
commerce."1  The Act, however, contains an "ultimate consumer"
as a basis for a general extension of coverage. Prior to the 1961 amendments,
the test of coverage was the work performed by the individual employee. To
be covered, the employee himself had to be engaged in interstate commerce or
the production of goods for interstate commerce. The business of the em-
ployer was not controlling. It was possible to have one employee in an estab-
lishment covered by the Act, while another employee working next to him
would be outside the law's scope.
This was changed by the "enterprise" concept. An employee is within the
Act's general coverage if, in any workweek, he is employed in "an enterprise
engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce." Under
this concept, all the employees of a particular business unit may be covered
by the Act, regardless of the relationship of their individual duties to commerce
or the production of goods for commerce.
Willis, supra note 9, at 625, quoting BNA, THE WAGE AND HouR IW 1 (rev. ed. 1967).
The effect of the amendment was to extend coverage to fellow employees. It was not
intended to increase the number of employers subject to the Act. See Maryland v.
Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 188 (1968).
A variety of business organizations have been held to be an enterprise. See, e.g.,
Hodgson v Eunice Superette, Inc., 368 F. Supp. 639 (W.D. La. 1973) (slaughterhouse
and retail grocery); Hodgson v. Leeco Gas Oil Co., 69 CCH Lab. Cas. 45,611 (M.D.
Fla. 1972) (construction, management, maintenance, and sale of apartment houses);
Hodgson v. Arlington Protective Agency, Inc., 68 CCH Lab. Cas. 45,362 (E.D. Va.
1972) (detective agency and protection agency); Hodgson v. Frisch's Dixie, Inc., 66
CCH Lab. Cas. 44,958 (W.D. Ky. 1971) (three drive-in restaurants); Hodgson v.
Schlosberg-Schnider Co., CCH Lab. Cas. 49,704 (E.D. Va. 1971) (real estate firm and
apartment complexes); Hodgson v. Greene's Propane Gas Serv., 64 CCH Lab. Cas.
44,630 (M.D. Ga. 1971) (dependent corporations, all family owned); Hodgson v.
Harvey Motor Co., 20 BNA WH Cases 493 (W.D. Tex.), affd, 461 F.2d 847 (5th
Cir. 1971) (new car sales and auto insurance); ef. Hodgson v. University Club Tower,
Inc., 20 BNA WH Cases 563 (N.D. Okla. 1971) (two apartment buildings and a hotel;
no "common business purpose").
13. Section 3(s) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 203(s) (Supp. IV, 1974) (emphasis
added), amending 29 U.S.C. § 203 (s) (1970), states in relevant part:
"Enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce"
means an enterprise which has employees engaged in commerce or in the
production of goods for commerce, or employees handling, selling, or otherwise
working on goods or materials that have been moved in or produced for com-
merce by any person, and which-
(1) . . . is an enterprise whose annual gross volume of sales made or busi-
ness done is not less than $250,000 ....
Section 3(s) was amended to read as above by the Act of April 8, 1974, Pub. L. 93-
259, § 6(a) (5), 88 Stat. 58, by adding the emphasized words and by deleting "including"
before "employees."
Under the enterprise concept, the "stream of commerce" test of coverage was rejected.
Courts look to whether the "employer's activities . . . are such as to exert a substantial
impact upon commerce . . . ." Wirtz v. Mayer Constr. Co., 291 F. Supp. 514, 517
(D.N.J. 1968). In this regard,
[C]ongress' overall view was that the local activities of employers subse-
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quent to interstate movement of goods are equally vital to such general welfare
(of workers) and hence entitled to the same legislative consideration and reg-
ulation as that originally extended to the handling of goods by employees en-
gaged in commerce, or in the production of goods for such commerce, before
the goods came to rest.
Id. at 518 (footnote omitted). See also H.R. 75, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961); S. 145,
87th Cong., Ist Sess. (1961).
By bringing under the Act all employees of an enterprise if any of its workers quali-
fied, Congress intended to expand greatly the coverage of the Act. See Wirtz v. Melos
Constr. Corp., 408 F.2d 626 (2d Cir. 1969). See also Brennan v. Iowa, 494 F.2d 100
(8th Cir. 1974) (state institutions can be enterprises; no ultimate consumer exclusion
since goods passed on to inmates); Brennan v. Hattan, 474 F.2d 9 (5th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 826 (1974) (installation and repair of air conditioning units); Brennan
v. Parnham, 366 F. Supp. 1014 (W.D. Pa. 1973) (towing vehicles interstate brought
enterprise into commerce); Brennan v. S & M Enterprises, 362 F. Supp. 595 (D.D.C.
1973) (public parking garage); Brennan v. Ventimiglia, 356 F. Supp. 281 (N.D. Ohio
1973) (servicing cars and selling products that originated out of state).
In Brennan v. Araheim & Neely, Inc., 410 U.S. 512 (1973), a real estate management
company that managed eight commercial office buildings under contract with the owners
was held to be an enterprise, since the company employed all the maintenance employees
in the various buildings. A fully integrated management corporation directed opera-
tions, and as such it was irrelevant that the owners of the individual buildings were
agents of defendants.
Since "goods" as used in § 3(s) is defined only in § 3(i), 29 U.S.C. § 203(i) (1970),
the ultimate consumer exclusion has been considered applicable to the determination
whether an enterprise is "engaged in the production of goods for commerce," or has em-
ployees "handling goods." See, e.g., Brennan v. Industrial America Corp., 371 F. Supp.
1164 (M.D. Fla. 1974). The difference, however, between the statutory language of
f 3(s), quoted in note 13 supra, and 3(j), quoted in note 9 supra, has been held to
tender the "come to rest" doctrine, see note 8 supra, inapplicable to enterprise coverage.
Since under § 3(s) it is only necessary that employees have worked on goods that
"have been moved in" commerce by any person, the position of goods in the stream of
commerce is irrelevant to determining enterprise coverage. Schultz v. Kip's Big Boy,
Inc., 431 F.2d 530, 531 (5th Cir. 1970); Schultz v. Deane-Hill Country Club, Inc., 310
F. Supp. 272 (E.D. Tenn. 1969), aff'd per curiam, 433 F.2d 1311 (6th Cir. 1970);
Hodgson v. Rivermont Corp., 71 CCH Lab. Cas. 45,962 (M.D. Fla. 1973).
It is immaterial.. . that the goods may have "come to rest" within the mean-
ing of the term "in commerce" as interpreted in other respects, before they are
handled, sold, or otherwise worked on by the employees of an enterprise ...
Thus, employees will be considered to be "handling, selling, or otherwise work-
ing on goods that have been moved in. . .commerce" where they are engaged
in the described activities on "goods" that have moved across State lines at any
time in the course of business, such as from manufacturer to the distributor
29 C.F.R. § 779.242 (1975).
The "purely local" doctrine has survived, however. See, e.g., Robertson v. Dailey
Elec. Supply Co., 369 F. Supp. 1069 (N.D. Tex. 1974). But where
[d]efendant's employees also use regularly goods which although purchased
locally have previously moved in interstate commerce . . . this is sufficient to
satisfy the test used to determine whether employees are engaged in interstate
commerce. § 203 (s) extends coverage to enterprises which may not purchase
goods directly from out-of-state but which do have employees who handle
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss3/11
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exclusion, which creates an exemption from the definition of "goods. '1 4
"goods that have been moved in... commerce" and which have come to rest
within the state.
Schultz v. Dean-Hill Country Club, supra at 277. See Montalvo v. Tower Life Bldg.,
426 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1970) (small amount of time engaged in interstate activity
irrelevant); Wirtz v. Mayer Constr. Co., supra; Wirtz v. Melos Constr. Co., supra;
Schultz v. Union Trust Bank, 297 F. Supp. 1274 (M.D. Fla. 1969); Hodgson v.
Howard, 69 CCH Lab. Cas. 45,602 (N.D. Ala. 1972) (laundry supplies); Wirtz v.
Washeterias, 59 CCH Lab. Cas. 43,641 (D.C.Z. 1968) (laundry supplies). See gen-
erally Donahue, Wage and Hour Developments-The Fair Labor Standards Act, 15
NYU CoNF. LA. 137 (1962); Nystrom, Current Problems In the Administration of
Wage-Hour Laws, 3 GA. L. REv. 362, 368-71 (1969); Willis, supra note 9, at 628-32.
There is also a volume of business requirement. The dollar volume of busi-
ness done by a firm managing rental property is measured by the gross rental receipts
received, rather than from the management's commission fees. Petrlik 'V. Community
Realty Co., 347 F. Supp. 638, 640 (D. Md. 1972). The gross receipts of all parts of
an enterprise must be accumulated to determine the volume of business. Wirtz v. Jerni-
gan, 405 F.2d 155, 159 (5th Cir. 1968); Schultz v. Dean-Hill Country Club, Inc., supra,
accord, Wirtz v. Columbian Mut. Life Ins. Co., 246 F. Supp. 198 (W.D. Tenn. 1965),
aff'd, 380 F.2d 903 (6th Cir. 1967). Only those parts of a business organization that
are part of the "enterprise" may be included in determining the 'Volume of business.
Schultz v. Mack Farland & Sons Roofing Co., 413 F.2d 1296 (5th Cir. 1969).
14. "Goods" is defined in 29 U.S.C. § 203 (i) (1970):
"Goods" means goods (including ships and marine equipment), wares, prod-
ucts, commodities, merchandise, or articles or subjects of commerce of any
character, or any part or ingredient thereof but does not include goods after
their delivery into the actual physical possession of the ultimate consumer
thereof other than a producer, manufacturer, or processor thereof.
Generally, the definition includes articles or subjects of commerce of any type, tangiblo
or intangible. See, e.g., Bozant v. Bank of N.Y., 156 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1946); Darr
v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 74 F. Supp. 80 (S.D.N.Y. 1947); Lenroot v. Western Union
Tel. Co., 52 F. Sapp. 142 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), aff'd, 141 F.2d 400 (2d Cir.), rev'd on other
grounds, 323 U.S. 490 (1945) (telegraph messages); Thomas v. Associated Cleaning
Contractors, Inc., 35 CCH Lab. Cas. 71,724 (N.D. Ga. 1958). If any ingredient of
an item is a good that has moved interstate, it is possible that the entire item is within
the statutory framework. See Mitchell v. Hooper Equip., 279 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1960);
McComb v. Super-A Fertilizer Works, 165 F.2d 824 (1st Cir. 1948); Bracey v. Luray,
138 F.2d 8 (4th Cir. 1943).
"Goods" includes documents that are essential to a business. Willmark Serv. Sys-
tem, Inc. v. Wirtz, 317 F.2d 486 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 897 (1963); Mitchell
v. Welcome Wagon, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 674 (W.D. Tenn. 1954), affl'd, 232 F.2d 892 (6th
Cir. 1956); Darr v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., supra (insurance policies). But see Stevens
v. Welcome Wagon Int'l, Inc., 390 F.2d 75 (3d Cir. 1968) (sending reports to home
divisional offices only incidental to operations); Billeaudeau v. Temple Associates, 213
F.2d 707 (5th Cir. 1954) (mailing reports to home office not covered since commerce
does not include commerce with oneself). Building and construction materials can be
"goods," Wirtz v. Mayer Constr. Co., 291 F. Supp. 514 (D.N.J. 1968); Donahue v.
George A. Fuller Co., 104 F. Supp. 145 (D.R.I. 1952), but such materials do not trigger
coverage of the Act if they are in the hands of an ultimate consumer. See Cooper v.
Rust Eng'r Co., 84 F. Supp. 149 (W.D. Ky. 1949), aff'd, 181 F.2d 107 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 340 U.S. 879 (1950). See note 15 infra.
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The receipt of goods by an employer who withdraws them from
commerce with no intention of further passing them through commerce
does not invoke coverage of the Act. 5
Before the 1961 and 1966 amendments, coverage of the Act and its
applicability to maintenance personnel depended upon the work per-
formed by individual employees.' Since the addition of "enterprise"
See generally George & Lambert, supra note 9, at 481-85; WECHT, supra note 9, at
148-68.
15. The availability of the exclusion hinges, to some extent, on the particular fact
pattern presented. See, e.g., Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968); Powell v. United
States Cartridge Co., 339 U.S. 497 (1950); Hamlet Ice Co. v. Fleming, 127 F.2d 165
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 634 (1942); Irby v. Davis, 311 F. Supp. 577 (E.D.
Ark. 1974) (materials in concrete slabs used in homes are useless in themselves and thus
the home-owner, not the builder, was the ultimate consumer); Brennan v. Patio Clean-
ers, Inc., 73 CCH Lab. Cas. 46,427 (S.D. Ohio 1974) (dry cleaning supplies; customers
were the ultimate consumers); Brennan v. Industrial America Corp., 73 CCH Lab. Cas.
46,417 (M.D. Fla. 1974) (gasoline used by trash collection company; company was the
ultimate consumer); Hodgson v. Unified School Dist. No. 490, 73 CCH Lab. Cas.
46,317 (D. Kan. 1973) (school supplies moved in commerce; students were ultimate
consumers); Futrell v. Columbia Club, Inc., 66 Lab. Cas. 44,944 (S.D. Ind. 1971) (pri-
vate club not the ultimate consumer since food and other items resold); Glick v. Mon-
tana, 65 CCH Lab. Cas. 44,734 (D. Mont. 1971) (books for school children are not
in the hands of the ultimate consumer even though state retains possession).
16. Before enterprise coverage was introduced in 1961, the Act covered only "em-
ployees engaged in commerce or the production of goods for commerce." See, e.g., Fair
Labor Standards Act §§ 6, 7, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207 (1970).
Some cases have found maintenance personnel to be "engaged in commerce." Bren-
nan v. Wilson Bldg., Inc., 478 F.2d 1090 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 855
(1973); Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp. v. Keen, 157 F.2d 310 (8th Cir. 1946) (retail
oil stations); Walling v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 61 F. Supp. 992 (E.D.S.C. 1945)
(bus terminal); Fleming v. American Stores Co., 42 F. Supp. 511 (E.D. Pa. 1941),
modified, 133 F.2d 840 (3d Cir. 1942) (warehouse).
Other cases have found it necessary to rely upon the "production of goods for com-
merce" language to extend coverage to maintenance personnel. Borden Co. v. Bordella,
325 U.S. 679 (1945); Nunn's Battery & Elec. Co. v. Wirtz, 335 F.2d 599 (5th Cir.
1964); cf. Thomason v. Alester G. Furman Co., 222 F.2d 421 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 865 (1955).
The Supreme Court established the limits of coverage under the "production of goods
for commerce" language in three cases. In A.B. Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U.S.
517 (1942), space in a loft building was rented to persons producing goods for interstate
commerce. The work of the maintenance personnel was found to be "necessary to the
production" as the Act then defined coverage, and the workers were covered. On the
other hand, in 10 East 40th St. Bldg., Inc. v. Callus, 325 U.S. 578, 583 (1945), the
Court found that "[riunning an office building as an entirely independent enterprise is
too many steps removed from the physical process of the production of goods." In
Borden Co. v. Bordella, supra, the Court reasoned that the interstate nature of
the tenant's business did not invoke coverage of the maintenance workers unless
the employees met the tests of relatedness and essentiality to the production process, but
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coverage, application of the Act to maintenance personnel has, in many
cases, turned on the availability of the ultimate consumer exclusion and
its conflict with the intended broad coverage of the Act.'7 In Brennan
v. Apartment Communities Corp.,'8 the building owner was held to be
an ultimate consumer since the supplies handled by its maintenance
personnel were neither resold nor passed on to tenants.'0 In Brennan v.
found that when the building was owned by an interstate producer who occupied most
of the building, the maintenance personnel were covered. See Johnson v. Dallas Down-
town Dev. Co., 132 F.2d 287 (5th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 790 (1943).
In response to the local test of 10 East 40th St. Bldg., Inc., and to determine the re-
latedness and essentiality of maintenance workers to commerce, the courts established
a 20 percent rule: If 20 percent of the tenants of a building or 20 percent of the floor
space is engaged in commerce or the production of goods for commerce, the employees
are held to have a sufficient nexus to commerce or production for commerce that they
are covered. See, e.g., Russell Co. v. McComb, 187 F.2d 524 (5th Cir. 1951) (85 per-
cent); Ullo v. Smith, 177 F.2d 101 (2d Cir. 1949); Roberg v. Phipp's Estate, 156 F.2d
958 (2d Cir. 1946); Schultz v. Isaac T. Cook Co., 314 F. Supp. 461 (E.D. Mo. 1970)
(5 out of 125 tenants insufficient); cf., Borden v. Bordella, supra; Schultz v. Blaustein
Indus., Inc., 321 F. Supp. 998 (D. Md. 1971) (85 percent).
An insufficient nexus between maintenance employees and the production process was
found in Hunter v. Madison Ave. Corp., 174 F.2d 164, 166 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
338 U.S. 836 (1949), citing with approval 10 E. 40th St. Bldg. v. Callus, 325 U.S. 578
(1945). See also Rucker v. First Nat'l Bank, 138 F.2d 699 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
312 U.S. 769 (1943); Ware v. Guilford Bldg., Inc., 313 F. Supp. 1061 (M.D.N.C. 1969),
aff'd per curiam, 427 F.2d 1368 (5th Cir. 1970).
See generally Willis, supra note 9, at 622-24.
17. Note that, while traditional coverage is still applied, see, e.g., Schultz v. Blau-
stein Indus., Inc., 321 F. Supp. 998 (D. Md. 1971), the broader concepts of enterprise
coverage often obviate the question of traditional coverage, see, e.g., Schultz v. Falk, 439
F.2d 340, 345 n.11 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 827 (1971).
Under the enterprise concept, workers are covered if they engaged in "handling, sell-
ing or otherwise working on goods that have been moved in or produced for commerce
. " Fair Labor Standards Act § 3(s), 29 U.S.C. § 203(s) (1970) (emphasis
added). A conflict arises when a worker is engaged in handling supplies that "have
been moved" in commerce or were "produced" for commerce, and thus apparently cap-
able of bringing the worker within coverage, but the supplies are such that the employer
will consume them, making the employer an ultimate consumer and thus taking the sup-
plies out of the definition of "goods," see note 14 supra. The use of the terms "have
been moved" and "produced" implies a congressional intent to cover goods after they
have left interstate commerce, while the ultimate consumer exclusion explicitly exempts
such supplies in many cases. See generally Note, Fair Labor Standards Act-Expanded
Coverage For Building Employees Under the Enterprise Doctrine, 20 WAYNE L. REV.
903 (1974).
18. 360 F. Supp. 1255 (D. Del. 1973).
19. Accord, Schultz v. Travis-Edwards, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 834 (W.D. La. 1970),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Hodgson v. Travis-Edwards, Inc., 465 F.2d 1050 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1076 (1972); Schultz v. Wilson Building, Inc., 320 F. Supp.
664 (S.D. Tex. 1970), affd on other grounds sub nom. Brennan v. Wilson Bldg., Inc.,
478 F.2d 1090 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 855 (1973). In these cases, supplies
handled by maintenance workers of an office building were not "goods" because theWashington University Open Scholarship
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Dillion,21 the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that, since the
cost of supplies used by maintenance personnel was passed on to tenants
in the form of rent, the tenants rather than the owner were the ultimate
consumers and the maintenance personnel were covered.21
Coverage of the Act was extended by amendment in 197422 to reach
the handling of "goods or materials" that moved in commerce. Con-
gress sought to expand and clarify coverage, and specifically criticized
several cases that had narrowly construed the statute's coverage lan-
guage. 23
Against this background, the court in Brennan v. Jaffey24 held that,
prior to the 1974 amendments, the employees were not within the Act's
coverage.25  The court refused to accept the Dillion reasoning that the
building tenants, not the owner, were ultimate consumers, labeling it a
"tortured interpretation. 2 6  Reaffirming Apartment Communities, the
building owners were held to be ultimate consumers. See note 14 supra. This interpre-
tation by the district courts was criticized in S. REP. No. 93-690, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
17 (1974). See note 23 infra and accompanying text. In Sharp v. Warner Holding
Co., 70 CCH Lab. Cas. 45,710 (D. Minn. 1972), the use of cleaning supplies by apart-
ment house maintenance employees on a regular and recurring basis to satisfy tenants'
needs established coverage. The employer constituted an enterprise, and the ultimate
consumer exclusion was seen as contemplating only the use of items for an organic part
of a business on a nonrecurring basis.
The effect of the exclusion is to exclude employees "whose enterprise would be
within the coverage of the Act on disparate occasions only because of extraordinary and
non-recurring purchases." Id. at 45,714.
20. 483 F.2d 1334 (10th Cir. 1973).
21. Accord, Hodgson v. Rivermont Corp., 71 CCH Lab. Cas. 45,962 (M.D. Fla.
1973); Mansdorf v. Ernest Tew & Associates, 69 CCH Lab. Cas. 45,595 (M.D. Fla.
1973).
22. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 6(a) (5), 88
Stat. 58, amending 29 U.S.C. § 203(s) (1970) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 203(a) (Supp.
IV, 1974)).
23. See S. RP. No. 93-690, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1974). The Senate Report
reasoned that
a few district courts have erroneously construed the "handling" clause as being
inapplicable to employees who handle goods used in their employer's own com-
mercial operations ....
Id., citing Schultz v. Wilson Bldg., Inc., 320 F. Supp. 664 (S.D. Tex.), aff'd on other
grounds, 478 F.2d 1090 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 855 (1973); Schultz v. Travis-
Edwards, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 348 (W.D. La. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 465 F.2d
1050 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1076 (1972). The report, however, did
not cite Apartment Communities, see notes 18 & 19 supra and accompanying text.
24. 380 F. Supp. 373 (D. Del. 1974).
25. Id. at 377. That defendant constituted an enterprise within the meaning of
§ 3(r) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 203(r) (1970), was conceded for the purpose of the
motion. Id. at 375.
26. This reasoning [of Dillion], it seems to this Court, is unrealistic and re-https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss3/11
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court found that the building owner was the ultimate consumer. Since
the employees did not handle "goods"27 as defined in the Act, the
employees were not covered, and dismissal of the claim was affirmed.
As to the postamendment allegations, however, the court refused to
grant summary judgment. Although the court reasoned that the added
term "materials" was synonymous with "goods," it noted that the legisla-
tive history of the 1974 amendment clearly indicated a congressional
intent to "clarify" the terms of enterprise coverage 2s and endorse the
Dillion construction of the coverage language. The similarity of Apart-
ment Communities to cases criticized in the Senate Report on the 1974
amendments placed Apartment Communities "at variance with the view
which Congress expressed in 1974."129 Consequently, the court refused
to dismiss the postamendment allegations.8" The court reasoned, how-
ever, that the intent of the 1974 Congress could not be imputed to an
earlier Congress and refused to apply this result to the pre-1974 allega-
tions.31
Although the legislative history of the 1974 amendments did not
expressly disapprove Apartment Communities, independent grounds
existed for reconsidering the decision. Generally, the Act is held to be
remedial in nature 2 and thus given a liberal construction38 Although
flects a tortured interpretation of the meaning normally attributed to the "ulti-
mate consumer" concept.
Id. at 377. The court rejected plaintiff's argument that the payment of rent constituted
a purchase of the supplies by simply noting that the tenant acquired no title to the light
bulbs or plumbing components handled by the maintenance personnel. Id. at 377, n.3.
27. Id. at 378; see note 14 supra.
28. id. at 378-79. However, the legislative history "meant only to clarify the
meaning which it (Congress) believed § 203(s) had theretofore rather than to expand
its pre-existing coverage." Id.
29. 380 F. Supp. at 379. The court noted that although Apartment Connunities
was not cited in the Senate Report, "its holding was essentially the same as those por-
tions of Travis-Edwards and Wilson Building disapproved of by the Report." Id.
30. Id.at379.
31. "The views of a subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the
intent of an earlier one." Id. at 379, citing United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313
(1960). Further, alluding to interpretations of the antitrust statutes, the court stated,
"'How members of the 1914 Congress may have interpreted the 1890 Act is not of
weight for the purpose of construing the Sherman Act."' Id., quoting United States v.
Wise, 370 U.S. 405 (1962).
32. See A.H. Phillips, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490 (1945); Wirtz v. Ti Ti Peat
Humus Co., 373 F.2d 209 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 834 (1967); Mitchell
v. Ballenger Paving Co., 299 F.2d 297 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 922 (1962);
McComb v. Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co., 167 F.2d 911 (10th Cir. 1948); Flem.
ing v. Warshawski & Co., 123 F.2d 622 (7th Cir. 1941).
33. See, e.g., Mitchell v. C.W, Vollmer & Co., 349 U.S. 427 (1955); Schultz v.Washington University Open Scholarship
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"goods" was broad enough to include the supplies involved in Apart-
ment Communities and the pre-amendment allegations in Jaffey, the
ultimate consumer exclusion prevented coverage. Yet an arguable pur-
pose of the exclusion is to ignore innocent violations of the "hot goods"
provision of the Act,34 which prohibits the transportation or sale of
goods produced under substandard labor conditions. The rental of
property can be said to be such a sale, and the exclusion was intended to
protect innocent consumers3 5 such as tenants, but not landlords.
The maintenance supplies involved in the pre-amendment allegations
in Jaffey fell within the continuity of commerce doctrine,8 which sug-
gests that goods moving in commerce are not exempt simply because
they have come to a temporary standstill in their passage through
commerce. The delay between the defendant's purchase and the ten-
ants' receipt of benefit would therefore be irrelevant .3  The "come
to rest" doctrine would not be applicable in retort, since it need not be
considered under enterprise coverage."' It is also possible that reli-
ance on the ultimate consumer exclusion under enterprise coverage is
misplaced, since Congress intended the "volume of business" prerequi-
site to be the primary limiting factor.3 9
Mack Farland & Sons Roofing Co., 413 F.2d 1296 (5th Cir. 1969); Lofther v. First
Nat'l Bank, 138 F.2d 299 (7th Cir. 1943); Ralph Knight, Inc. v. Mantel, 135 F.2d 514
(8th Cir. 1943); Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 135 F.2d
320 (5th Cir. 1943), aff'd, 321 U.S. 590 (1944); Consolidated Timber Co. v. Womack,
132 F.2d 101 (9th Cir. 1942).
Exemptions are usually construed narrowly. Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc., 361 U.S.
388 (1960); Mitchell v. Kentucky Fin. Co., 359 U.S. 290 (1958); Wirtz v. Jernigan,
405 F.2d 155 (5th Cir. 1968).
34. Fair Labor Standards Act § 15, 29 U.S.C. § 215 (1970). As to the notion that
the purpose of the ultimate consumer exclusion was to protect against these provisions,
ee Powell v. United States Cartridge Co., 339 U.S. 497, 514 n.16 (1950); Brennan v.
Dillion, 483 F.2d 1334 (10th Cir. 1973); Hodgson v. David M. Woolin & Son, Inc.,
65 CCH Lab. Cas. 44,865 (S.D. Fla. 1971); Gorden v. Paducah Ice Mfg. Co., 41 F.
Supp. 980 (W.D. Ky. 1941).
35. See Sharp v. Warner Holding Co., 70 CCH Lab. Cas. 45,710 (D. Minn. 1972);
S. REP. No. 1487, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
36. See notes 9 & 13 supra.
37. Id.
38. See note 13 supra.
39. See Sharp v. Warner Holding Co., 70 CCH Lab. Cas. 45,710 (D. Minn. 1972).
Finally the [dollar volume test] in the committee bill is not the constitutional
standard for coverage. The constitutional standard for coverage is contained
in these requirements which have just been discussed [enterprises in commerce
or the production of goods for commerce].
The [dollar volume test] is an economic test. It is the line which the Con-
gress must draw in determining who shall and who shall not be covered by
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Many of the cases relied on by the court have been reversed.40 The
1974 amendments show the intent of Congress to clarify the meaning of
enterprise coverage. This clarification dealt specifically with a confus-
ing body of case law. By adding "materials" to "goods" with a disjunc-
tive "or," Congress intended that "working on. . . materials. . . that
have been moved in. . . commerce" would remove the need to consider
the ultimate consumer exclusion for materials, since reference to the
definition of "goods" is unnecessary.41 While this construction and the
accompanying legislative history comprise a clear legislative mandate,
the Jaffey court chose not to apply it to the preamendment allegations.
As to the postamendment allegations, the court, having noted the
congressional intent to clarify coverage, had little choice but to deny
defendant's motion for summary judgment. The courts treatment of
the addition of "materials,"42 however, read the new word very narrow-
ly. While the court correctly concluded that Congress had meant to
clarify the Act's pre-existing meaning, it refused to fully effectuate this
clarification by applying it to the pre-1974 allegations.48
a minimum wage. It is a way of saying that anyone who is operating a busi-
ness of that size in commerce can afford to pay his employees the minimum
wage under this law.
S. REP. No. 145, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961). See Brief for Plaintiff opposing sum-
mary judgment at 18, 19, Brennan v. Jaffey, 380 F. Supp. 373 (D. Del. 1974); Defend-
ant's Reply Brief at 12, 13, Brennan v. Jaffey, 380 F. Supp. 373 (D. Del. 1974).
40. See notes 2 & 23 supra. Hamlet Ice Co. v. Fleming, 127 F.2d 165 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 317 U.S. 634 (1942), relied on in Apartment Communities, has not been
overruled. Hamlet Ice involved, however, only traditional coverage, and its weight as
precedent should be reconsidered in light of congressional efforts to expand coverage.
41. See notes 13 and 14 supra.
42. 380 F. Supp. at 378.
43. The principle of 'United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960), see note 31
supra, has been reiterated many times, but most often in construing the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954. E.g. Walt Disney Productions v. United States, 480 F.2d 66, 68 (9th
Cir. 1973); Brown v. United States, 426 F.2d 355, 357 (Ct. Cl. 1970); Pacific Nat'l
Ins. Co. v. United States, 422 F.2d 26, 32 (9th Cir. 1970). However, in Haynes v.
United States, 390 U.S. 85, 87 (1968), the Court cited Price, but went on to look at
the committee reports on amendments to determine the purpose of the National Firearms
Act, 26 U.S.C. 5851 (1970). Further, Bobsee Corp. v. United States, 411 F.2d 231 (5th
Cir. 1969), cited Price, but stated that "the corollary of this proposition is not that such
statements should be disregarded altogether. . . . [They are] entitled to some consid-
eration as a secondarily authoritative expression of expert opinion." Id. at 237 n.18.
In Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Fain, 383 F.2d 166, 175 (2d Cir. 1967), it was noted
that the views of a later Congress can be useful in determining the intent of an earlier
one. The Court in Federal Housing Admin. v. Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84 (1958),
in looking at the National Housing Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1743 (1970), cited Price, but then
stated that "the later law is entitled to weight when it comes to the problem of construe-
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Because of the recent amendments, the court's refusal to include the
earlier allegations will be of little importance. As to future violations,
the 1974 amendments are controlling. There is now little doubt that
apartment house maintenance employees are covered by the Act when
some connection with commerce is found. The court's failure, however,
to find specific meaning in the term "materials" arguably demonstrates
an unwillingness to extend coverage to activities other than those in the
cases 44 cited in the legislative history, as well as an intent to recognize
the ultimate consumer exclusion when it may not be warranted. Given
the previously expansive interpretations of "goods" and "engaged in
commerce," however, the court's analysis is not likely to slow the
growing reach of the Act or have substantial precedential significance.
tion." Id. at 90. See Sioux Tribe v. United States, 316 U.S. 317, 329-30 (1941). When
later views confirm a prior interpretation, they may be considered. See Jacques Isler
Corp. v. United States, 306 F. Supp. 452, 460 (Cust. Ct. 1969).
United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405 (1962), dealt with the penal provisions of the
Clayton Act § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 24 (1914). The Jaffey court was dealing with a remedial
statute that specified evils to be corrected and advanced the appropriate remedies. The
considerations are far different from those involved in penal statutes or the Internal Rev-
enue Code. In light of the congressional criticism of cases similar to Apartment Com-
munities and the clear support given to those holding the opposite, as well as the broad
humanitarian purposes of the statute, an overruling of Apartment Communities would
have been eminently reasonable.
44. See 380 F. Supp. at 378-79, quoting S. REP. No. 93-690, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
17 (1974).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss3/11
